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REFERENDUMS’ BY CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, ORAN DOYLE 
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Oran Doyle, David Kenny and Christopher McCrudden have provided 
an invaluable contribution to the recent output of thoughtful debate and 
reflection about the future constitutional status of Northern Ireland and on 
concrete questions concerning how potential future referendums on its status 
should be organised. The authors probe the critical, but perhaps surprisingly 
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under-explored question of who should be allowed to vote in any referendums 
held to consider whether Northern Ireland should leave the United Kingdom 
and unify with Ireland. The authors highlight how the Belfast / Good Friday 
Agreement (hereafter ‘the Agreement’) and Northern Ireland Act 1998 (‘the 
Act’) provide little in the way of firm guidance on this question. 
The Agreement and Act provide that Northern Ireland shall not cease to be 
part of the United Kingdom unless a majority of the people of Northern Ireland 
voting in a poll approve unification. The Act provides that the scheduling of the 
relevant poll is the responsibility of the secretary of state for Northern Ireland 
but that the secretary of state must exercise this power to set a poll date if ‘it 
appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that 
Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part 
of a united Ireland.’ But the crucial question of who may participate in the poll 
is left, via Article 4(1) of Schedule 4(1) of the Act, to the capacious discretion of 
the secretary of state who ‘shall specify…the persons entitled to vote’. 
This discretion is not unbounded of course. The Agreement and the Act’s 
discussion of the future status of Northern Ireland is, as the authors note, 
quite clear in at least one critical respect—that it is for the ‘people of the 
island of Ireland alone’ to determine if unification and a transfer of sover-
eignty over the territory should come about. That is, the people of Northern 
Ireland voting in respect of this question for Northern Ireland and the people 
of Ireland voting to settle this question for the Irish state. This puts outer 
limits on the secretary of state’s statutory discretion. For example, any move 
to construct a franchise that included a UK-wide voting base would be a ‘clear 
breach of the UK’s international law obligations’ under the agreement. And 
aside from any adverse political backlash it would spark, statutory discretion 
exercised in this manner would also invite legal challenge on the basis it is 
being exercised ultra vires the Act giving effect to the Agreement.
But outer bounds aside, the discretion of the secretary of state seems very 
broad indeed. As the authors point out, although one can discern limits on it 
from the underlying principles of the Act and the Agreement, it remains the case 
neither offer detailed guidance on what factors should govern construction of the 
franchise. Nor is there any other existing legislation bearing on the question of the 
legal scope of the secretary of state’s discretion. The authors also outline how ‘soft 
law’ in the form of best practice guidelines produced by respected international 
human rights/good governance bodies equally do not provide clear direction for 
how this statutory discretion ought to be exercised in respect of issues like setting 
the voting age and the entitlement of foreign nationals to participate.
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What we are left with then is a zone of considerable political autonomy 
to structure the franchise loosely cabined by legal directives. In the idiom of 
the classic legal tradition, we can say the secretary of state enjoys wide scope 
to make a ‘determination’—a legal ordinance issued by a political author-
ity making more concrete the general principles of a broader statutory and 
constitutional framework, in a manner that should be both faithful to the 
framework and conducive to law’s ultimate purpose of securing the common 
good.1 Core conditions of virtually any articulation of the common good are 
peace, social stability and promotion of civic friendship instantiated through a 
broadly shared belief by citizens in the fundamental legitimacy of their polit-
ical process (whatever its perceived imperfections). It is, in the end, concern 
for these conditions which should orient and structure the capacious discre-
tion of the secretary of state: to avoid constructing the franchise in a manner 
which would undermine trust in the poll’s integrity or erode a sense of shared 
agreement that it enjoys legitimacy as a non-partisan mechanism for defini-
tively settling the question of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. 
Given these considerations, there may be considerable prudence in following 
what the authors highlight as the now considerably consistent practice2 in the UK 
of aligning the franchise for referendums with ‘the franchise for legislative elec-
tions taking place over the same area as the given referendum’.3 In other words, 
as McCrudden, Doyle and Kenny note, a practice whereby ‘UK-wide referendums 
use the UK parliamentary franchise, while Scottish and Welsh referendums use 
the franchise for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly’. This would mean 
alignment of the unification referendum franchise with that used for elections to 
the Northern Ireland Assembly; an approach the authors note found favour with 
the UCL Constitution Unit’s Independent Commission on Referendums.4 
If this franchise is followed—an arrangement crucially none of the major 
parties of the nationalist or unionist community have ever mounted sustained 
opposition to—then potentially divisive and destabilising questions like setting 
the voting age, the enfranchisement of EU and non-EU foreign nationals, or 
1 John Finnis, ‘Natural Law theories’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/natural-law-theories/ (accessed 7 April 2021).
2 But as the authors note, not an unbroken one, given that the referendum in Northern Ireland on the Agreement 
adopted the Westminster franchise. 
3 Interim Report of the Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland (UCL, 2020), 178.
4 The Constitution Unit is a non-partisan research centre based in University College London. The Commission 
members were volunteers drawn from academia, politics, media and civil society groups. The Commission was 
aided by a Secretariat of academic experts. See https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/elections-and-
referendums/independent-commission-referendums (7 April 2021).
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prisoners, may be settled without inviting serious political recrimination. 
Conversely, without a clear collective preference expressed through something 
like a unanimous Assembly resolution, a significant departure from consistent 
UK practice and crafting a de facto franchise may be riskier from the point of 
view of maintaining social stability and the perceived legitimacy of the polling 
process across all segments of the polity. It may be riskier as departure from a 
status quo adhered to without much controversy for Assembly elections may 
be regarded as giving an advantage to one ‘side’ of the unification debate. This 
could create a potentially destabilising perception that any hypothetical de 
facto franchise will be based on opportunistic demographic calculation about 
which categories are more or less likely to vote in favour of a unity referendum, 
rather than a good faith attempt to capture what the people of Northern Ireland 
can best be described as including or excluding.5 It is easy to imagine the serious 
negative ramifications such a narrative could generate both in the run-up to, 
and in the aftermath of, any poll.
But as the authors note, there are political risks on all sides of this question 
which must be prudently grappled with. Regardless of the path adopted in the 
end, it should at least be uncontentious to suggest it ought to be chosen well 
before a referendum is held; and through political judgement informed by 
caution, consultation, and above all an orientation toward the common good, 
of which peace and social stability are central conditions. 
 
5 For example, the clear nationalist/unionist split in a 2012 Assembly resolution calling for Westminster to 
legislate for a reduction in the Assembly voting age shows that there is likely concern in the unionist political 
community that current demographic trends ensuring the extension to the franchise to 16–17-year-olds may 
represent a significant boon for those in favour of unification. See http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-
business/official-report/reports-12-13/06-november-2012#8 (7 April 2021) 
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